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In this paper we use a transparent statistical methodology – synthetic control methods – to 
implement data-driven comparative studies about the impact of autocratic transition on real 
per capita GDP. The applied methodology compares the growth of countries that experienced 
a transition to autocracy with the growth of a convex combination of similar countries that 
remained democratic, and it accommodates for the time-varying impact of unobservable 
heterogeneity. To implement this statistical framework, in a panel of 160 countries, we focus 
on 14 episodes of transition from democracy to autocracy. We find that the effects of 
autocratic transitions come in all shapes and sizes, since our data are split in almost equal 
parts between insignificant, negative, and positive effects. We also find that negative effects 
tend to get worse over time, and that African countries are badly affected by the autocratic 
transition possibly because of a resource curse. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The economic growth literature has witnessed three main strands of research. The first, in the 
50s and 60s, was primarily concerned with the accumulation of capital, along Solovian lines. 
The second, in the 70s and 80s, was concerned with the policies that governments may 
implement in order to achieve sustained growth. The third claims that institutions are the main 
determinants of growth. Probably the most basic institutional feature concerns the democratic 
vs. autocratic nature of the state. With this respect, the results of the literature have been 
disappointing, uncovering a very weak relationship between democracy and growth. 
Recently, Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008) have explored several issues on the 
relationship between democracy and growth emphasizing the role of heterogeneity by using a 
semi-parametric methodology (i.e., diff-in-diff propensity score matching) that relaxes 
linearity and is therefore well suited for the study of this feature.
 They find much larger 
effects than those commonly found in the literature. In particular, transitions from democracy 
to autocracy have an average negative effect on growth of about 2 percentage points, which 
implies a 45% income drop at the end of their sample. 
In this paper, we apply the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) to perform data-driven comparative case studies. 
We evaluate the effect of a binary treatment – autocratic transition – on real per capita income 
in a panel framework. The proposed methodology accounts for the presence of a time-varying 
impact of country unobservable characteristics, and therefore overcomes a major drawback of 
more standard estimators. Put in a different way, we ask whether the establishment of an 
autocratic regime in year T0 will lead to higher growth in the years T0 + i compared to similar 
countries that remained democratic. We therefore estimate the dynamic treatment effects of 
autocratic transition on growth over time (within a 10-year horizon). The advantage of this 
approach rests on the transparent construction of the counterfactual outcome of the treated 
country, that is, a linear combination of untreated countries: the synthetic control. The 
comparison countries that form the synthetic control (and their relative weights) are selected 
based on their similarity to the treated country before the treatment takes place, both with 
respect to past realizations of the outcome and the standard covariates used in the growth 
literature. The transparency of this (matching) algorithm safeguards against drawing inference 
from (disputable) parametric extrapolation. 
To anchor our results to the existing literature, we use the data set by Persson and 
Tabellini (2006, 2008). Because the synthetic control method is best suited for sharp regime   3
changes, we define as autocratic transition – the treatment of interest – a drop of at least 10 
points in the Polity IV Index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) making a country cross the 
democratic threshold at zero. We are, therefore, able to identify 14 autocratic transitions in 
our data, which range from 1963 to 2000. Note that the diff-in-diff matching results by 
Persson and Tabellini (2008) are based on 18 autocratic transitions satisfying their common 
support condition, 10 of which overlap with our set of feasible country experiments. 
  We find that the effects of autocracy transitions come in all shapes and sizes since our 
dataset is split in almost equal parts between insignificant, negative, and positive effects. We 
also find that negative effects tend to get worse over time, and that African countries are badly 
affected by these transitions, possibly because of a resource curse. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the effects of 
both democracy and autocracy on growth. Section 3 outlines the statistical methodology. 
Section 4 presents the data and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review 
 
2.1 Democracy and growth 
 
The literature on democracy and growth has uncovered an extremely weak (and more often 
negative) relationship between these variables. We can distinguish between two strands of 
empirical literature: the first employing cross-sectional data, and the second using panel data.
1 
There is also a small literature on the effects of autocracy on growth that we take into account.  
  Barro (1996) analyses a cross-section of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. The 
dependent variables are the growth rate of real per capita GDP over 1965-1975, 1975-1985, 
1985-1990 using a system of three equations. Estimations are done by instrumental variables: 
the instruments are the five-year earlier value of log GDP, the actual values of schooling, life-
expectancy, rule of law and terms of trade, and the earlier values of the other variables (which 
include the fertility rate, government consumption ratio, public educational spending ratio, 
black market premium, investment ratio) involved in the estimations. Democracy is measured 
by Bollen (1960) and the Gastil Index. The estimated coefficient of democracy is negative but 
                                                 
1 For earlier surveys of economic theories on the link between democracy and growth, see Przeworski and 
Limongi (1993) and Przeworski et al. (2000); de Haan and Siermann (1995) provide a useful summary table of 
several studies reporting the conclusion, the employed measure of democracy, the critiques to that measure, and 
the econometric specification.   4
not significantly different from zero, which Barro claims to be weakly negative. However, 
there is a positive nonlinear effect: the middle level of democracy is the most favorable to 
growth, the lowest comes second, and the highest third. According to Barro, maintenance of 
the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption and high human capital are the 
most important determinants of growth.    
  In a similar setting, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) aim at distinguishing between the 
possible channels that link democracy and growth. They identify eight variables that can 
possibly be endogenous to democracy, therefore weakening Barro results: political instability, 
governance distortions, government size, human capital, income inequality, trade openness, 
and physical capital accumulation. To achieve identification a number of exogenous variables 
are used, belonging to the following groups: cultural, demographic, gravity, historical, log of 
income per capita and its squared value. A system of eight simultaneous equations is 
estimated via three-stage least squares. Data are five-year averages of the variables involved 
in the analysis for 65 countries over 1970-1989. They find that the overall effect of 
democracy on growth is negative. This result is the outcome of a positive effect growth via 
human capital accumulation and reduction of income inequality, and a negative effect of 
reduced physical capital accumulation and increased government consumption. 
Starting from the inconclusive results of this literature, Aghion et al. (2007) 
decompose the effect of democracy on several sectors, characterized by different productivity 
levels and patterns of technological development. Using UNIDO data for 28 manufacturing 
sectors for 180 countries for the period 1963 to 2003, they find that democratic institutions 
and political rights enhance growth of sectors close to the technological frontier. Second, they 
notice that political rights are associated with freedom of entry and the latter is especially 
important for sectors close to the technological frontier. Third, more advanced economies 
benefit more from democratic institutions and therefore the demand for democracy should 
increase with the level of per capita income in a country. 
  A more recent wave of research applies panel data with a diff-in-diff methodology.
2 In 
particular, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008) apply this 
methodology on about 160 countries over the period 1960-2000, exploring issues ranging 
                                                 
2 Note that this methodology considers as treated those countries that underwent a single transition from 
autocracy to democracy, and as control those countries that remained autocracies. The methodology rests on two 
assumptions. First, without any regime change, growth in treated countries should counterfactually have been the 
same as in control countries, other things being equal. Second, heterogeneity in the effects of democracy should 
be unrelated with the occurrence of democracy itself.   5
from the relationship between political and economic liberalizations to the effect of 
democracy on growth, taking into account (time-invariant) unobservable heterogeneity. In 
general, these results seem more favorable to a positive link between democracy and growth. 
Their treatment definition is similar to ours, as they focus on regime change rather than the 
simple (cross-sectional) comparison of different regimes. 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) study the timing of political and economic 
liberalizations. They find that political reforms cause economic liberalizations, but they 
cannot rule out feedback effects in both directions. Moreover, countries that first liberalize 
and then become democracies do much better than countries that pursue the opposite 
sequence. Persson and Tabellini (2006) report that a new parliamentary democracy is more 
prone to pursue economic liberalizations than a new presidential democracy but, given the 
results of Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), liberalizations following democratizations have 
weaker effects on growth. Parliamentary democracies raise government consumption much 
more than presidential democracies, reducing growth. Spending effects of the electoral system 
are less pronounced and do not affect growth. 
Persson and Tabellini (2009) note that, if democracy has a positive effect on growth 
and long-run income, it also raises the returns to investment. Because investment reacts to 
expected returns, expected, and not just actual, regime change affects growth. Growth will 
accelerate before an anticipated democratization, and decelerate well before an anticipated 
coup. In their model the probability of regime change depends on a country’s “democratic 
capital”. This capital is assumed to accumulate in years of democracy and in countries with 
democratic neighbors, but to depreciate under autocracy. The results are consistent with the 
model in the usual sample, and also in another one dating from 1850 to 2000. 
Persson and Tabellini (2008) explore issues on the relationship between democracy 
and growth emphasizing the role of heterogeneity. They combine the above mentioned 
method with the propensity score matching estimator.  This semi-parametric methodology 
relaxes linearity and it is therefore well suited for the study of heterogeneity, an issue already 
in the background in the early studies on democracy and growth.
3 The cost is a loss in the 
efficiency of the estimates. They also find that the discrepancies relative to the parametric 
                                                 
3 Diff-in-diff propensity score matching, similarly to the synthetic control method we apply in this paper (see 
Section 3), relaxes the linearity assumption of the standard diff-in-diff and, by transparently checking for the 
existence of a common support between treated and control units, avoid drawing inference from parametric 
extrapolation. However, this methodology, unlike ours, still rely on the assumption that the impact of 
unobservable confounders must be time-invariant.   6
results are driven by large differences in the composition of the treatment and control groups, 
making linearity a doubtful assumption. Moving to the results, they uncover a positive but 
insignificant effect of transitions from autocracy to democracy. 
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) consider democratization processes for about 65 
countries over 1960-2000. They employ an event study approach and analyze growth before 
and after democratizations. The dynamic panel estimates imply that democratizations are 
associated with a one percent increase in real per capita growth. Furthermore, during the 
transition, growth is slow and even negative; after the third post-democratization year, growth 
peaks and stabilizes at a higher level.
4 
 Acemoglu  et al. (2008) are interested in the causal relationship between income and 
democracy, that is, the “modernization hypothesis”: the increase in industrialization, 
urbanization, wealth and education lead to more democracy. They employ two strategies: first 
use country fixed effects to get rid of country specific characteristics that may affect both 
variables. Second, they apply an instrumental variables strategy, by using past savings rates 
and changes in the incomes of trading partners. The estimated coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero both in the post-WWII era and over 100 years. The authors 
claim that the positive “correlation between changes in income and democracy is caused some 
societies have embarked on divergent development paths at some critical junctures during the 
past 500 years” (Acemoglu et al., 2008: 813). They identify these critical junctures with 
factors dating back 500 years ago (constraints on the executive, year of independence, 
religious affiliation). In a companion work, Acemoglu et al. (2010) look at the effect of 
income on transition to and from democracy. Again, they show that in a linear model with 
country fixed effects the correlation disappears, and this is also true in double hazard model 
for the simultaneous estimation of these two possible transitions. 
 
2.2 Autocracy and growth 
 
The economic analysis of the link between autocracy and growth is much less developed. The 
‘stationary bandits’ theory of dictatorship (McGuire and Olson, 1996) explains different 
economic performances among autocracies in a model in which an autocrat maximizes his 
private consumption subject to the probability of staying in power. If a dictator expects to stay 
in power for a long period of time, he has an incentive to promote economic development 
                                                 
4 See also Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b).   7
because he will then increase his private consumption through increased tax revenues 
resulting from economic growth.
5 
  Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) develop a theory on the accountability of an autocrat 
with respect to the ‘selectorate’, the group of individuals on whom the leader depends to hold 
into power. Good policy is implemented when the selectorate removes poorly performing 
leaders. This happens if the selectorate’s hold on power is not too dependent on a specific 
leader being in office. The paper empirically establishes cases where autocracy has been 
successful according to various criteria. They use these case studies to identify the selectorate 
in specific instances of successful autocracy, and also show that leadership turnover in 
successful autocracies is higher than in unsuccessful autocracies. Finally, they demonstrate – 
by exploiting leadership deaths from natural causes – that successful autocracies appear to 
have found ways for selectorates to nominate successors without losing power. 
  In our framework, the treatment of interest is not autocracy per se but autocratic 
transition. The estimation of the effects of autocratic transition has been highlighted in a few 
papers. As mentioned above, Persson and Tabellini (2008) find an average negative effect on 
growth of leaving democracy of about 2 percentage points, and this accounts for a 45 percent 
loss of income over the sample. Furthermore, the transparency of their matching estimator in 
small samples allows them to identify the countries excluded from the estimation because 
outside of the common support (see Table 13.3b), as well as the estimated treatment effect for 
each episode of autocratic transition (see Figure 13.5). Among their 18 autocratic transitions, 
4 experienced a mildly positive growth effect (i.e., below 2 percentage points), 7 a mildly 
negative effect, and 7 a strong negative effect (i.e., above 2 percentage points). Below we will 
come back in more detail to the comparison of our country results with those of their study. 
  Finally, note that Persson and Tabellini’s (2008) results complement those of Minier 
(1998), who finds that countries that become less democratic grow more slowly than 
comparable countries. In contrast, Durham (1999) discovers that policy discretion associated 
with less democratic regimes inhibits investment in poorer countries. This stands out against 
the theory. Also, single-party dictatorships have higher investment ratios, but do not grow 
faster than party-less regimes. 
                                                 
5 Grossman and Noh (1994) and Overland et al. (2005) assume that a dictator’s survival is more likely if he 
adopts welfare-enhancing policies. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assume that welfare-enhancing policies 
directly reduce the dictator’s survival prospects while increasing the survival chance through competition for 
power with a challenger. Consequently, successful autocrats are either those who are secure enough or those who 
face tough competition from a challenger.   8
 
3.  Methodology 
 
In this paper, we apply the synthetic control method (SCM) – developed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in Abadie et al. (2010) – to the investigation of the effects 
of autocratic transitions on growth. Under this approach, a weighted combination of potential 
comparison countries – the synthetic control – is constructed to approximate the most relevant 
characteristics of the country affected by the intervention. After a regime change (i.e., a 
transition to autocracy) takes place in a given country, the SCM can be used to estimate the 
counterfactual situation of this country in the absence of the regime change by looking at the 
outcome trend of the synthetic control. In our empirical application, we consider countries 
that become autocracies in a particular year and compare them with countries that remain 
democratic for at least 10 more years (or until the end of the sample). 
To summarize the SCM approach, it is useful to reason in terms of potential outcomes 
in a panel set-up. Assume that we observe a panel of IC +1 countries over T periods. Only 
country  i receives the treatment (i.e., becomes an autocracy) at time T0 < T, while the 
remaining IC potential control countries remain democratic. The treatment effect for country i 
at time t can be defined as: 
  
) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( it it it it it Y Y Y Y − = − = τ        ( 1 )  
 
where Yit(T) stands for the potential outcome associated with  } 1 , 0 { ∈ T , that is, real GDP per 
capita according to whether the economy is democratic or autocratic. The estimand of interest 
is the vector of dynamic treatment effects (τi,T0+1, ..., τi,T). For any period t > T0, the estimation 
of the treatment effect is complicated by the missing counterfactual Yit(0). Abadie et al. 
(2010) show how to identify the above dynamic treatment effects under the following general 
model for potential outcomes: 
  
jt t jt v Y + = δ ) 0 (          ( 2 )  
   jt jt t jt v Y + + = τ δ ) 1 (          ( 3 )  
  it j t t j jt Z v ε μ λ θ + + =        ( 4 )  
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where Zj is a vector of relevant observed covariates that are not affected by the intervention 
and can be either time-invariant or time-varying; θt is a vector of parameters; μj is a country-
specific unobservable; λt is an unknown common factor; and εjt are transitory shocks with zero 
mean. In the present context, as all of the variables in Zj (initial GDP, population growth, 
secondary school enrollment, and investment share) refer to the pre-treatment period, the 
assumption that they are not affected by the treatment means that we have to rule out 
“anticipation” effects, i.e., that those variables immediately change in response to the 
anticipation of the future reform. Interestingly, the above model allows for the impact of 
unobservable country heterogeneity to vary with time, while, on the contrary, the usual diff-
in-diff (fixed-effects) specification imposes λt to be constant across time. 
Define W = (ω1, ... , ωIC )’ as a generic (IC × 1) vector of weights such that ωj ≥ 0 and 
∑ =1 j ω . Each value of W represents a potential synthetic control for country i. Further 
define  ∑ = =
To
1 s s j s
k
j Y k Y as a generic linear combination of pre-treatment outcomes. Abadie et 
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is an unbiased estimator of τit. Condition (5) can hold exactly only if ( i
k
i Z Y , ) belongs to the 
convex hull of [( 1 1 ,Z Y
k ), …, ( Ic
k
Ic Z Y , )]. Hence, the synthetic control W* is selected so that 
condition (5) holds approximately: the distance (or pseudo-distance) between the vector of 
pre-treatment characteristics of the treated country and the vector of the pre-treatment 
characteristics of the potential synthetic control is minimized with respect to W* and 
according to a specified metric.
6 The deviation from condition (5) imposed by this 
implementation process, however, can be assessed in the data, and it should be shown as a 
complementary output of the analysis. 
                                                 
6 In the empirical analysis, we use the (data-driven) distance metric calculated by the Stata routine synth, 
available at: www.people.fas.harvard.edu/_jhainm/software.htm. See Abadie et al. (2010) for technical details. 
   10
In words, the synthetic control algorithm estimates the missing counterfactual as a 
weighted average of the outcomes of potential comparison countries (i.e., the synthetic 
control of the treated country). The weights are chosen so that the pre-treatment outcome and 
the covariates of the synthetic control are, on average, very similar to those of the treated 
country. This approach comes with the evident advantages of transparency (as the weights W* 
identify the countries that are used to estimate the counterfactual outcome of the country that 
became autocratic) and flexibility (as the set of IC potential controls can be appropriately 
restricted to make the underlying country comparisons more sensible). Furthermore, the SCM 
rests on identification assumptions that are weaker than those required by estimators 
commonly applied in the growth literature. As discussed above, while standard panel models 
can only control for confounding factors that are time invariant (fixed effects) or share a 
common trend (diff-in-diff), the model specified in equation (4) allows the effect of 
unobservable confounding factors to vary with time. 
The only limitation of the SCM is that it does not allow to assess the significance of 
the results using standard (large-sample) inferential techniques, as the number of units in the 
control pool and the number of periods covered by the sample are usually quite small in 
comparative case studies like ours. As suggested by Abadie et al. (2010), however, placebo 
experiments can be implemented to draw inference. Below we implement cross-sectional 
placebo tests, which consist in applying the SCM to every country in the pool of potential 
controls; this is meant to assess whether the estimated effect for the treated country is large 
relative to the effect for a country chosen at random. In particular, placebo testing compares 
the estimated treatment effect for the country under investigation with all the (fake) treatment 
effects of the control countries, obtained from experiments where each control country is 
assumed to shift to autocracy in the same year of the treated country. If the estimated effect in 
the treated country is larger than those in most of the (fake) experiments, we can safely 
conclude that the baseline results are not just driven by random chance. 
 
4.  Data and empirical results 
 
Moving to the data, we define as autocratic transition a drop of at least 10 points in the Polity 
IV Index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009) by crossing the zero value.
7 The value of zero is the 
standard threshold used in the literature to distinguish autocracies (negative values) from 
                                                 
7 The “Polity Score” captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Appendix I briefly describes the transitions in our sample.   11
democracies (positive values). Starting with a data set of about 160 advanced and developing 
countries, we identify 14 episodes of transition to autocracy. The time-span runs from 1963 to 
2000, but for each country we end up using different time-spans based on the year in which 
the transition took place. In fact, we use 1963 to T0 as the pre-treatment period, and T0 to 
T0+5 (or T0+10) as the post-treatment periods, where T0 is the year of the autocratic 
transition. The set of control variables used in this paper includes those usually employed in 
the growth literature (initial GDP, investment as a share of GDP, population growth, and 
secondary school enrollment). The outcome – real per capita GDP – and the control variables 
are drawn from the data set by Persson and Tabellini (2006, 2008). 
  We now discuss each SCM country experiment and the associated placebo test, in 
order. In every experiment, the synthetic control is constructed from a worldwide pool of 
potential comparisons countries: that is, all eligible countries that are a democracy and remain 
so within ten years after the treatment at time T0.
8 Tables 1 through 3 compare the treated 
countries and their synthetic control before and after the transitions by both per capita GDP 
and explanatory variables; the root mean squared prediction error (referred to the pre-
treatment fit) is also reported. Appendix II records the countries that are included in the donor 
pool of each SCM experiment, and Appendix III lists those that are indeed selected as 
components of the estimated synthetic control (in particular, those receiving a weight higher 
than 0.02). Figures 1 through 14 allow a graphical evaluation of the pre- and post-treatment fit 
by looking at the proximity of the outcome trends of each treated country (solid line) and its 
synthetic control (dashed line) before and after T0 (i.e., on the left and on the right of the 
vertical dashed line, respectively). These figures – in the right panel – also report the placebo 
tests for each SCM experiment. There, the solid line represents the pre- and post-treatment 
outcome difference between the treated country and its synthetic control (i.e., the counterpart 
of the baseline estimation results reported in the left panel of each figure), while the dashed 
lines refer to the (fake) placebo experiments where each of the potential comparison countries 
is assumed to be the treated country at T0. 
  Table 1 considers OECD and Asian economies. The economic consequence of the 
transition looks negligible for Greece, as its real per capita GDP five years later is very 
                                                 
8 As a robustness check, in the spirit of Billmeier and Nannicini (2009b), for each treated country we also 
implemented an alternative experiment with a restricted donor pool of potential controls, including only 
countries in the same macro area of the treated country (OECD, Latin America, Asia, or Africa). For most 
experiments, the pre-treatment fit was quite poor; in the remaining feasible experiments, however, the findings 
were qualitatively similar to those presented in this section (results available upon request).   12
similar, only slightly lower, to the outcome of the synthetic control. For Greece, the SCM 
experiment ends in 1974 (the year of a new transition from autocracy to democracy) and we 
therefore cannot report the outcome difference at T0+10. Figure 1 shows that indeed the 
patterns of real per capita income in the treated country and synthetic control are very close to 
each other after T0 (left panel), and the placebo test confirms the insignificance of the 
dynamic treatment effects (right panel). The autocratic transition in Greece had no significant 
impact on growth. This is in contrast with the result by Persson and Tabellini (2008, Figure 
13.5), who estimate a strong negative treatment effect for Greece. 
For the Philippines, we have almost no effect of the autocratic transition at T0+5 (-0.01 
percentage points per year), and a small positive effect (+0.59) ten years after the transition. 
In Figure 2, the synthetic control, in fact, shows an excellent fit of GDP both before and after 
the treatment. In the case of South Korea, the economic outcome of the transition is strongly 
positive in the first five years (+7.92 percentage point per year), and still sizable – albeit 
smaller – ten years after the coup (+3.98). Figure 3 illustrates this baseline result in the left 
panel, and the placebo test (right panel) confirms its robustness, because the post-treatment 
difference between South Korea and its synthetic control is the upper bound of all the 
differences in the (fake) placebo experiments. Pakistan presents a zero effect at T0+5, and an 
extremely small effect at T0+10. The insignificance of the effect is confirmed by the placebo 
test in the right panel of Figure 4. While the results for Philippines and Pakistan are not 
inconsistent with those by Persson and Tabellini (2008, Figure 13.5), we find a strong positive 
effect for South Korea, as opposed to a mildly negative effect in their study. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figures 1-4 about here] 
 
  Table 2 considers Latin American economies. Again, the effects of autocratic 
transitions are mixed. Panama displays a mildly positive effect five years after the coup 
(+1.59), but this effect is strongly reduced at T0+10 (+0.35). Figure 5 (left panel) shows that 
there is a growth acceleration immediately before the coup, a positive gap is then created with 
respect to similar countries that remained democratic, and from 1973 there is a growth 
reduction that brings Panama back on the same path of its synthetic control. The placebo test  
(right panel) confirms the robustness of the positive effect after five years (because it is 
greater than those of most fake experiments), but not after ten years. Similarly, a small 
positive effect is found for Uruguay (+0.65), but in this case the effect is strongly reinforced   13
in the longer run (+3.10 at T0+10). The placebo test in the right panel of Figure 7 confirms the 
positive effect for Uruguay, especially at the end of the post-treatment period. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Figures 5-8 about here] 
 
Peru and Chile, instead, exhibit negative effects. The former, five years after the coup, 
had a decline of -0.65 percentage points per year in GDP with respect to similar democratic 
countries, and this effect reached -3.10 after ten years. The latter experienced a decrease of 
4.48 percentage points per year within five years, and -1.56 after ten years. The case of Chile 
is interesting because it is widely recognized as a success story in Latin America. Indeed, in 
Figure 8, we observe a serious drop in GDP in the years after the Pinochet takeover, due to 
the harsh fight between the junta and opponents, but this is followed by a strong recovery that 
brings the country back to the growth pattern of the other countries of the control, when free-
market policies are implemented. Yet, the recovery is far from complete at the end of the 
post-treatment period. The placebo tests for Peru (Figure 6) and Chile (Figure 8) confirm the 
baseline negative results, as the post-treatment outcome difference between the treated 
country and its synthetic control is the lower bound of all the differences in the (fake) placebo 
experiments. For Latin America, Persson and Tabellini (2008, figure 13.5) find the same 
qualitative result for Uruguay and Peru, but the opposite result for Chile and Panama. 
Table 3 considers African economies. In the analysis of African countries, a more 
consistent and negative effect of autocratic transitions emerges, and this outcome tends to 
exacerbate over time. This is the case of Uganda (-0.51 percentage points per year in the first 
five years after the transition, and -4.03 after ten years), Nigeria in 1984 (-3.12 and -3.81), 
Sierra Leone (-0.67 and -0.90), and Gambia (-3.33 in five years).
9 Mildly positive effects can 
be found in the transitions of Lesotho (+0.52 after five years and +2.93 after ten years) and 
Nigeria (+1.10 and +0.91). The placebo tests, however, do no always confirm the robustness 
of the above results. Only the negative results of the experiment for Gambia are clearly 
confirmed (see the right panel of Figure 14), because the, negative, post-treatment solid line is 
the lower bound of all the others. At a closer look, however, also Uganda and Nigeria in 1984 
display a negative impact of the autocratic transition that is higher than those of most placebo 
experiments: this is only overshadowed – in Figure 9 and Figure 11, respectively – by a scale 
effect (that is, by the fact that some experiments involving richer countries display very large 
                                                 
9 For Gambia we can only estimate GDP at T0 + 5 due to data limitations.   14
differences in absolute terms).  The results for Nigeria in 1966, Sierra Leone, and Lesotho are 
not robust to placebo testing. At the end of the day, all of the three African experiments that 
pass the placebo check show a negative impact of autocratic transition on growth. 
The results for Africa are not easily comparable to those by Persson and Tabellini 
(2008) because Uganda, Lesotho, and Nigeria fall outside their common support and are 
therefore excluded by the estimates. Yet, their results for Sierra Leone are consistent with 
ours, while those for Gambia are not. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Figures 9-14 about here] 
 
The predominance of negative results in Africa can probably be related with the 
presence of a “resource curse” (see, among others, Sachs and Warner, 2001): when an 
oligarchy puts its hands over natural resources, it tends to extract rents form them and not to 
invest in the development of the country. In this respect, note that Nigeria is an oil-exporting 
country; Sierra Leone is a producer of diamonds, iron and bauxite; and Uganda sells abroad 
copper and cobalt. Gambia does not fall into this group, but the downturn was mainly due to 
economic sanctions set by the United Kingdom – its major trading partner – after the coup. 
Indirectly, this conclusion is reinforced by the circumstance that the first autocratic transition 
in Nigeria did not produce a negative effect on growth in a time in which oil was not yet a 
source of income for the government: it accounted for about 9% of GDP in 1966 and for 
about 18% in 1984 (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003); in terms of total revenues it raised 
from 25% to 74% (Forrest, 1992).
10 This is also consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2010), who 
claim that military coups are more likely in resource-rich countries. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed the economic effect of leaving democracy in 14 episodes 
through a novel econometric approach for case studies, the synthetic control method. This 
approach allows taking into account a time-varying impact of country heterogeneity, and 
therefore overcomes a major drawback of more standard estimation techniques. 
  We get a number of interesting results. First, we find an almost equal split of our 
episodes between positive (South Korea, Panama, and Uruguay), negative (Chile, Peru, 
                                                 
10 Lesotho became an important diamonds producer in the second half of the ‘70s.   15
Uganda, Nigeria in 1984, and Gambia), and insignificant (Greece, Philippines, Pakistan, 
Nigeria in 1966, Sierra Leone, and Lesotho) consequences of autocratic transitions on 
economic growth. The negative effect shown by Chile is more the outcome of a very large 
medium-term fall in GDP that takes a long time to get recovered. With this respect, we find 
evidence contrasting with the (more pronounced) negative results found by Persson and 
Tabellini (2008). Second, when the effect of the transition is negative, it tends to worsen over 
time (with the significant exception of Chile), whereas the opposite is not usually true. Third, 
Africa has mainly negative effects on GDP possibly because of the interaction of the 
autocratic transition with a resource curse. 
   16
Table 1: Predictor and outcome means for the autocracy treatment (OECD and Asia) 
  Greece 1967 Synthetic Control 
Secondary school  43 36.85
Population growth  0.610 1.713
Investment share  0.338 0.204
Average Pre-treatment GDP  4185.7 4186.9
GDP at To + 5  7670 7862.75
GDP at To + 10 
RMSPE  71.436
  Philippines 1972 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  37.6 24.69
Population growth  3.055 2.554
Investment share  0.150 0.137
Average Pre-treatment GDP  792.5 789.5
GDP at To + 5  1070 1106.75
GDP at To + 10  1180 1113.25
RMSPE     4.403
  South Korea 1972 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  34.53 8.27
Population growth  2.467 1.792
Investment share  0.200 0.143
Average Pre-treatment GDP  1640.83 1649.24
GDP at To + 5  3460 2478.08
GDP at To + 10  4170 2982.56
RMSPE     117.534
  Pakistan 1977 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  12.62 22.76
Population growth  2.903 2.216
Investment share  0.138 0.126
Average Pre-treatment GDP  238.76 239.42
GDP at To + 5  346 348.35
GDP at To + 10  410 422.69
RMSPE     14.587
Notes: The table shows the mean values of predictors and outcomes for the treated country and the 
synthetic control, respectively. Predictors: pre-treatment real GDP per capita, secondary school enrollment, 
population growth, investment share. Outcome: real GDP per capita. The value of each predictor is 
averaged over the pre-treatment period. The values of the outcome refer to five years (T0 + 5) and ten years 
(T0 + 10) after the treatment year T0. RMSPE stands for Root Mean Squared Prediction Error.   
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Table 2: Predictor and outcome means for the autocracy treatment (Latin America) 
  Panama 1968 Synthetic Control 
Secondary school  31.5 11.58
Population growth  2.913 2.192
Investment share  0.205 0.124
Average Pre-treatment GDP  1763.75 1766.45
GDP at To + 5  2600 2407.95
GDP at To + 10  2690 2596.94
RMSPE     41.151
  Peru 1968 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  20 26.16
Population growth  2.842 2.661
Investment share  0.352 0.128
Average Pre-treatment GDP  2116.25 2116.131
GDP at To + 5  2450 2849.94
GDP at To + 10  2480 3633.14
RMSPE     23.549
  Uruguay 1972 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  46.6 27.62
Population growth  0.985 3.425
Investment share  0.123 0.326
Average Pre-treatment GDP  3859.16 3888.76
GDP at To + 5  4470 4328.88
GDP at To + 10  4710 3593.12
RMSPE     199.020
  Chile 1973 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  31.8 23.8
Population growth  2.160 2.98
Investment share  0.188 0.164
Average Pre-treatment GDP  2224.61 2218.96
GDP at To + 5  2340 3015.79
GDP at To + 10  2300 2726.61
RMSPE     46.154
Notes: See above. 
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Table 3: Predictor and outcome means for the autocracy treatment (Africa) 
  Uganda 1966 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  3.5 5.78
Population growth  3.954 2.529
Investment share  0.016 0.031
Average Pre-treatment GDP  205.66 208.23
GDP at To + 5  233.71 239.87
GDP at To + 10  200.63 335.35
RMSPE     0.000028
  Nigeria 1966 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  4.5 19.027
Population growth  2.568 2.423
Investment share  0.042 0.139
Average Pre-treatment GDP  230.5 230.74
GDP at To + 5  294 278.58
GDP at To + 10  319 295.29
RMSPE     2.781
  Nigeria 1984 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  17.21 28.48
Population growth  2.809 2.277
Investment share  0.078 0.125
Average Pre-treatment GDP  276.2 279.54
GDP at To + 5  246 357.99
GDP at To + 10  254 410.86
RMSPE     38.980
  Sierra Leone 1971 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  5.33 18.24
Population growth  1.679 2.5140
Investment share  0.021 0.145
Average Pre-treatment GDP  242.27 242.70
GDP at To + 5  278 287.68
GDP at To + 10  289 317.61
RMSPE     5.164
  Lesotho 1970 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  3.5 16.26
Population growth  1.992 2.541
Investment share  0.033 0.141
Average Pre-treatment GDP  206.8 207.70
GDP at To + 5  258 251.43
GDP at To + 10  364 281.46
RMSPE     9.642
  Gambia 1994 Synthetic Control
Secondary school  14.3 36.16
Population growth  3.254 2.203
Investment share  0.043 0.125
Average Pre-treatment GDP  354 362.73
GDP at To + 5  365 547.65
GDP at To + 10     
RMSPE     30.792
Notes: See above.   19
Figure 1 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Greece 1967   
     
         Greece vs. Synthetic Control                               Placebo test 
 
 
Figure 2 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Philippines 1972  
     
   Philippines vs. Synthetic Control                              Placebo test                                    
 
 
Figure 3 – Trends in real GDP per capita, South Korea 1972  
       
   South Korea vs. Synthetic Control               Placebo test   20
Figure 4 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Pakistan 1977 
      
        Pakistan vs. Synthetic Control          Placebo test  
 
 
Figure 5 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Panama 1968  
    
     Panama vs. Synthetic Control        Placebo test 
 
 
Figure 6 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Peru 1968 
     
      Peru vs. Synthetic Control         Placebo test   21
Figure 7 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Uruguay 1972   
      
        Uruguay vs. Synthetic Control           Placebo test 
 
Figure 8 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Chile 1973  
    
                    Chile vs. Synthetic Control                   Placebo test 
 
 
Figure 9 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Uganda 1966  
      
       Uganda vs. Synthetic Control          Placebo test   22
Figure 10 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Nigeria 1966     
    
  Nigeria 1966 vs. Synthetic Control               Placebo test 
 
Figure 11 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Nigeria 1984     
    
  Nigeria 1984 vs. Synthetic Control                 Placebo test 
 
 
Figure 12 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Sierra Leone 1971   
    
Sierra Leone vs. Synthetic Control                  Placebo test 
   23
 
Figure 13 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Lesotho 1970  
     
        Lesotho vs. Synthetic Control                      Placebo test  
 
 
Figure 14 – Trends in real GDP per capita, Gambia 1994  
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Appendix I - Transitions to autocracy
12 
Chile 1973: On September 11, 1973 the government of President Salvador Allende was 
overthrown by the military in a coup d’état. General Augusto Pinochet assumed power after 
deposing President Salvador Allende, establishing an anti-communist military dictatorship 
that ruled until 1990.  
Gambia 1994: Until the military coup in 1994, Gambia was ruled by President Dawda 
Kairaba Jawara, who had been elected five times in a raw.  In 1994, the  Armed Forces 
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) deposed the Jawara government and banned opposition 
political activity. Lieutenant Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh, chairman of the AFPRC, became head of 
state.  
Greece 1967: Rule by the military started in the morning of 21 April 1967 with a coup d'état 
led by a group of colonels of the Greek military, and ended in July 1974. "The Regime of the 
Colonels" refers to a series of right-wing military governments that ruled Greece from 1967 to 
1974. 
 
Lesotho 1970: In January 1970 the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) lost the first post-
independence general elections 36. Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan refused to cede power to 
the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), declared himself Tona Kholo, and imprisoned the BCP 
leadership. 
 
Nigeria 1966: The first military coup was in January and led by a collection of young leftists 
under Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. This coup was counter-
acted by another successful plot, which allowed Lt Colonel Yakubu Gowon to become head 
of state.   
Nigeria 1984: A new constitution was approved in 1977, and in 1979 Shehu Shagari won 
democratic elections. A military coup in 1983 established the High Military Council as new 
ruling body. 
Panama 1968: A military coup overthrew the elected government headed by Arnulfo Arias 
Madrid. Generale Omar Torrijos exerted power over the junta until his death in 1981 in an 
alleged plane accident.  
Pakistan 1977: In 1977 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto enjoyed an unprecedented victory and became 
Prime Minister, and then a staged military coup headed by Zia-ul-Haq apprehended him on 
issues of vote-rigging and banned all political activities leading the nation into a martial law.  
Peru 1968: The elected government of President Fernando Belaunde Terry was deposed by 
coup; he was succeeded by General Juan Velasco Alvardo. 
Philippines 1972: Barred from seeking a third term, President Ferdinand Marcos declared 
martial law on September 21, 1972, under the guise of increased political instability and 
resurgent Communist and Muslim insurgencies, and ruled the country by decree. 
 
                                                 
12 The source is Wikipedia, accessed on November 4
th, 2009.   25
Sierra Leone 1971: After a closely contested general elections in March 1967, Siaka Stevens, 
candidate of the All People's Congress (APC) was appointed new prime minister. He was 
subject to a number of coups. On April 19, 1971, parliament declared Sierra Leone a 
Republic. Siaka Stevens' title was changed from Prime Minister to President. Guinean troops 
requested by Stevens to support his government were in the country from 1971 to 1973. The 
opposition boycotted the 1973 general election. 
 
South Korea 1972: On December 6, 1971, Park declared a state of national emergency. On 
July 4 of the following year, he announced plans for reunification with North Korea. Park 
declared martial law in October 1972, dissolving the National Assembly. The Fourth Republic 
began with the adoption of the Yusin Constitution in November 1972. This new constitution 
gave Park effective control over the parliament. 
 
Uganda 1966: In 1966, Milton Obote overthrew the king Edward Muteesa II, the President 
and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. A Parliament dominated by the Uganda 
People's Congress changed the constitution, and Obote became president. The elections were 
suspended, ushering in an era of coups and counter-coups, which would last until the mid-
1980s. Obote was deposed twice from office, both times by military coup.   
 
Uruguay 1972: President Jorge Pacheco declared a state of emergency in 1968, followed by a 
further suspension of civil liberties in 1972 by his successor, President Juan María 
Bordaberry. After defeating the Tupamaros, the military seized power in 1973. In 1980, the 
army forces proposed a change in the constitution that would be passed with a referendum. 
The "No" to the reform won the vote with 57.2% of the votes. In 1984, massive protests 
against military rule broke out, and the country returned to civilian rule with national 
elections held later in the same year. 
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Appendix II - Treated countries and donor pools for the synthetic control experiments 
 
Greece 1967   
Potential controls   Australia,  Austria,  Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,  Fiji, 
India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe Trinidad & 
Tobago, Venezuela. 
  
Philippines 1972   
Potential controls  Fiji,  India,  Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe 
Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela. 
  
South Korea 1972   
Potential controls  Fiji, India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, 
 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica,Trinidad & Tobago, Mauritius, South 
Africa, Zimbabwe, Venezuela. 
  
Pakistan 1977   
Potential controls  Fiji, India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, 
 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Venezuela, South Africa, Zimbabwe. 
  
Panama 1968   
Potential  controls  Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, 
Mauritius, South Africa, India, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri 
Lanka, Botswana, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Fiji. 
  
Peru 1968   
Potential controls  Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, India, 
Malaysia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, Mauritius, 
South Africa, Pakistan, Zimbabwe. 
  
Uruguay 1972   
Potential controls  Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, India, 
 
Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, 
Mauritius, South Africa, Fiji. 
  
Chile 1973   
Potential controls  Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela, India, 
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Botswana, Mauritius,South 
Africa, Zimbabwe,Fiji. 
  
Uganda 1966   
Potential controls  Botswana,  Mauritius,  South Africa, Zimbabwe, India, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Philippines, South Korea, Chile, Pakistan, Fiji,Trinidad & 
Tobago,Papua New Guinea,Gambia. 
  
Nigeria 1966   
Potential controls  Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, India, Malaysia, Papua 
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Venezuela, Uruguay, Philippines, South Korea, Chile, 
Pakistan, Fiji.   27
  
Sierra Leone 1971   
Potential controls  Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, India, Malaysia, Papua 
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Venezuela, Pakistan, Fiji. 
  
Lesotho 1970   
Potential controls  Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, Zimbabwe, India, Malaysia, Papua 
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Venezuela, Pakistan, Fiji. 
  
Nigeria 1984   
Potential controls  Botswana,  Mauritius,  South Africa, India, Malaysia, Papua New 
Guinea, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Venezuela, Thailand, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru. 
  
Gambia 1994   
Potential controls  Botswana,  Mauritius,  South Africa, India, Malaysia, Papua New 
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Appendix III – Control countries with weight higher than 0.02 in the synthetic control 
 
ASIA     LAAM     AFRICA 
PHILIPPINES 1972    PANAMA 1968    UGANDA 1966 
Synth. Control     Synth. Control     Synth. Control  
Costa Rica  0.115    Papua N. Guinea  0.495  Botswana  0.127
India 0.608    South  Africa  0.320   Gambia  0.784
Malaysia  0.124    Trinidad & Tob.  0.185   India  0.030
Mauritius 0.116       
Venezuela 0.032        
         
SOUTH KOREA 1972    PERU 1968    NIGERIA 1966   
Synth. Control      Synth. Control     Synth. Control  
Botswana  0.602   Costa  Rica  0.392  Costa  Rica  0.021
South  Africa  0.398   Malaysia  0.059  India  0.608
   South  Africa  0.034 Pakistan  0.371
    Trinidad & Tob.  0.515  
         
PAKISTAN 1977     URUGUAY 1972    SIERRA LEONE 1971 
Synth. Control     Synth. Control      Synth. Control  
Botswana  0.057   Mauritius  0.056  India  0.556
India  0.920   Venezuela  0.944  Pakistan  0.378
Papua N. Guinea  0.023       Zimbabwe  0.061
           
     CHILE 1973    LESOTHO 1970 
OECD    Synth. Control    Synth. Control  
GREECE 1967   Costa  Rica  0.391  India  0.398
Synth. Control     Fiji  0.052  Pakistan  0.601
Papua N. Guinea  0.415    Mauritius  0.312      
Japan 0.288    South  Africa  0.150   NIGERIA 1984 
Jamaica 0.214    Venezuela  0.095   Synth. Control  
South  Africa  0.052      India  0.983
New  Zealand  0.031         
         GAMBIA 1994 
           Synth. Control  
          India  0.969
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